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Limits to the Independent Anti-Corruption Commission
Model of Corruption Reform: Lessons from Indonesia
Leslie Gielow Jacobs* and Benjamin B. Wagner**
Various strategies have proliferated to combat the plague of public corruption,
which exists everywhere, but wreaks its most debilitating havoc in developing
countries. A wide range of entities are now involved in the worldwide anti-corruption
campaign, including international organizations, governments of developed and
developing countries, development banks and international financial institutions,
multinational corporations, business associations, non-governmental organizations
(NGO's), the media and civil society bodies within corruption-ridden countries.'
From these entities' many experiences and insights have emerged various
"models" of reform, built upon "pillars" comprised of categories of measures
necessary to address the systemic and entrenched corruption that exists in many
developing countries.2 These general types of efforts that make up robust or
"holistic" models of corruption reform include prevention, state-building, activating
civil society, and, necessarily and inevitably, enforcement Even as observers opine
that criminal law alone cannot do the job or that other types of measures are more
fundamental, these obeservers agree that effective criminal law enforcement is one
essential element in a successful anti-corruption campaign.'
* Leslie Gielow Jacobs is a Professor of Law, Pacific McGeorge School of Law and the Director of the
Institute for the Development of Legal Infrastructure, Center for Global Business and Development. Thanks to
Kim Clarke for her excellent research assistance.
** Benjamin B. Wagner is Assistant U.S. Attorney and Chief of the Special Prosecutions Unit for the
U.S. Attorney's Office, Eastern District of California. He has also served as U.S. Department of Justice
Resident Legal Advisor in Indonesia from 2005-2006. The views expressed herein are the authors' views, and
do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. Department of Justice.
1. BUREAU FOR INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS AND LAW ENFORCEMENT AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
STATE, FIGHTING GLOBAL CORRUPTION: BUSINESS RISK MANAGEMENT (May 2001), http://www.state.gov/
p/inl/rls/rpt/fgcrpt/2001 ("Many international organizations have been making strides in addressing international
bribery in business transactions, official public corruption, and transparency issues. In addition to the OECD,
the Organization of American States (OAS), the Council of Europe (COE), the Stability Pact for South Eastern
Europe, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Asia Pacific Economic
Cooperation (APEC) forum, the Global Coalition for Africa (GCA) and the United Nations have launched a
variety of anticorruption and transparency initiatives. . . . U.S. and international legal, business and accounting
associations and non-governmental organizations (NGOs)-such as the American Bar Association (ABA), the
U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), the Ethics Officer Association
(EOA), the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations (COSO), and Transparency International (TI) - have played
key advisory roles in the development of various anticorruption initiatives.").
2. See Transparency International's National Integrity System, http://transparency.org/policy-research/
ach/introduction ("Represented by the image of a temple, where key institutions form pillars which rest on the
foundations of public awareness and values, and which, in turn, support the country's integrity, the National
Integrity System illustrates the interdependence of institutions in the fight against corruption.").
3. Jeremy Pope, Elements of a Successful Anti-Corruption Campaign, in CURBING CORRUPTION 97-104
(Rick Stapenhurst & Sahr J. Kpundeh, eds. 1999) ("CURBING CORRUPTION"); Ben W. Heineman, Jr. & Fritz
Heimann, The Long War Against Corruption, FOREIGN AFFAIRS May-June 2006, at 75.
4. See Susan Rose-Ackerman, Corruption and the Criminal Law, 2 Forum on Crime and Society 3,
(2002) ("[Tlhe criminal law can play a role as a backstop lying behind the needed structural changes."); Daniel
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To accomplish these multiple objectives, and particularly to centralize and
invigorate criminal enforcement, creating an independent anti-corruption agency
has been a popular strategy. Two prominent corruption-reform models-the
World Bank and Transparency International's "National Integrity System"5 and
the OECD's "Ethics Infrastructure" 6-recommend this strategy, with the Asian-
Pacific examples of Hong Kong's Independent Commission Against Corruption
(ICAC) and Singapore's Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau (CPIB) widely
hailed as success stories.7
However, as most acknowledge, corruption-reduction is not a one-size-fits-
all endeavor. Reform strategies must be tailored to corruption's history, culture
and manifestations in particular countries. Moreover, our observations indicate
that an anti-corruption agency mechanism that works in the small, relatively
homogenous city-states of Hong Kong and Singapore should be transported with
great care into nations where the law enforcement challenges are broader and
more diverse, both geographically and numerically. Specifically, creating and
privileging an anti-corruption agency in a sprawling country like Indonesia risks
undermining the possibility of effective, independent law enforcement more
generally, where the law enforcement agencies are a crucial pillar of good
governance and upon which sustained corruption reduction depends.'
Kaufmann, Revisiting Anti-Corruption Strategies: Tilt Towards Incentive-Drive Approaches, in CORRUPTION
AND INTEGRITY IMPROVEMENT INITIATIVES IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 63 (1998) ("While ex post ("curative")
measures would be expected to be a component in any anti-corruption strategy, we argue that excessive focus
on such ex post legal and institutional enforcement perspective, at the expense of ex ante preventative
approaches will not be effective."); Claes Sandgren, Combating Corruption: The Misunderstood Role of Law,
39 Int'l Law. 717, 728 (2005) ("In order to effectively combat corruption, it is necessary to focus on the
workings of institutions, not individuals. Penal law is therefore of less importance than one might think. This is
not to deny, however, that the criminal prosecution of corrupt activities-and associated activities such as
money laundering-may give the business community a strong signal .... To charge high-level individuals,
whether in business, public institutions or politics, with collusive corruption increases the trust of ordinary
people in the system and consequently their support in the fight against corruption.").
5. Jeremy Pope, Confronting Corruption: The Elements of a National Integrity System, 95-104 (2000),
available at http://www.transparency.org/publications/sourcebook.
6. Janos Bertok, Getting the Public Ethics Right, OECD Observer (July 2000), http://www.oecdob
server.org/news/fullstory.php/aid/293.
7. B.E.D. de Speville, The Experience of Hong Kong, China, in Combating Corruption, in CURBING
CORRUPTION, supra note 4, at 51-58; Tan Ah Leak, The Experience of Singapore in Combating Corruption, in
CURBING CORRUPTION, supra note 4, at 59-66; Chua Cher Yak, Resource Material Series No. 65, Corruption
Control: More than Just Structures, Systems and Processes Alone 229-237 (March 2005), http://www.unafei.
or.jp/english/pdf/PDF rms/no65/RESOURCE-DivisionNol5.pdf.
8. Others have noted the difficulty of transporting the Anti-Corruption Agency models of Hong Kong
and Singapore into other countries. See United Nations Development Programme, Institutional Arrangements to
Combat Corruption: A Comparative Study 5 (2005) ("[S]everal countries have opted for or are currently
considering creating an independent commission or agency charges with the overall responsibility of combating
corruption. However, the creation of such an institution is not a panacea to the scourge of corruption. There are
actually very few examples of successful independent anti-corruption commissions/agencies."); African anti-
corruption commissions, Why ACCs Succeed, www.u4.no/themes/aacc/accsucesses.cfm (last visited Nov. 7,
2007) ("Hong Kong and Singapore [may] serve as examples of good practice but their exceptionalism as city
states and broader preventive anti-corruption measures also need to be weighed in the balance when assessing
the impact of ACCs [anti-corruption agencies].").
Global Business & Development Law Journal/Vol. 20
The creation of an anti-corruption agency is a politically attractive measure,
an achievement that a government can cite as a tangible step in furthering an anti-
corruption agenda. But the prototype of the independent anti-corruption agency
also responds to the real need in many developing countries to isolate corruption
reform implementation from government bureaucracies that are themselves
riddled with corruption, including law Enforcement and the judiciary, and to put
substantial financial and dedicated professional commitment behind an objective
that has before received only lip service. Certainly, both of these circumstances
exist in Indonesia. Corruption pervades the police, 9 the prosecutors of the
Attorney General's Office' and the judiciary, from regional judges" up to
Supreme Court justices.' 2 Within existing institutional structures, therefore, it is
difficult to achieve the sort of honest and efficient law enforcement efforts
necessary to punish perpetrators, deter future offenders, and change the culture of
corruption.
Consistent with the model mechanism, Indonesia's Corruption Eradication
Commission or KPK 3 was formed to operate "independently, free from any and
all influences," with the "primary purpose of improving the effectiveness and
efficiency of efforts to eradicate criminal acts of corruption.' ' The same law that
created the KPK mandated the creation of a Special Court for Corruption, to try
corruption cases brought by the KPK. 5 The KPK's responsibilities include
prevention, state-building and public education, but the primary thrust of its
activities thus far has been law enforcement-investigating and prosecuting
major corruption cases. Both the KPK and the Special Court for Corruption were
created for the express purpose of circumventing the historically corrupt and
ineffective law enforcement agencies and judiciary.'
6
9. Indonesia Corruption Watch, Getting Rid of Corruption in Indonesia: The Future (Feb. 14, 2005),
http://www.antikorupsi.org/eng/mod.php?mod=publisher&op=viewarticle&artid=345 (noting that "[i]t is widely
believed that the issuance of an SP3 [Letter for the Termination of an Investigation] often depends on a bribe.").
10. Indonesian A-G Signals Crackdown on Corrupt Prosecutors, ABC News Online, May 14, 2007,
http://www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2007/05/14/1922751.htm ("Indonesia's new Attorney-General has admitted
four out of five prosecutors in Indonesia are open to corruption but says he will root out the wrongdoers.").
11. Adrian Verity, Skewed Justice in Indonesia's Tainted Courts, ASIA SENTINEL, Aug. 21, 2006,
http://www.asiasentinel.com/index.php?option=com-content&task=view&id=97&ltemid=3I ("[Aiccording to
Asep Rahmat Fajar, head of the Indonesian Judicial Monitoring Society, ... 'buying court verdicts has been a
systematic and organized crime in the country's legal system. It involves people from the highest levels, such as
high court judges, down to the lowest levels, such as administrative staff in the Supreme Court.").
12. SEBASTIAN POMPE, THE INDONESIAN SUPREME COURT, A STUDY IN INSTITUTIONAL COLLAPSE 416
(2005) ("It is currently common knowledge that the Supreme Court is affected by corruption, and judges in
private conversation have referred to it for many years as a routine matter.").
13. Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi.
14. Law Number 30 of 2002 on the Commission for the Eradication of Criminal Acts of Corruption,
Arts. 3 and 4, http://wwwI.oecd.org/daf/asiacom/pdf/indonesia_302002_KPK.pdf [Hereinafter "Law
30/2002"].
15. Law 30/2002, Arts. 53-62.
16. The preamble to the 2002 law specifically observes that existing government agencies had not been
effective in handling corruption cases.
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The KPK has the power to initiate investigations and prosecutions and to
take over from the Attorney General's Office investigations that are lagging.
Although its attention to other types of reform efforts was less substantial, the
KPK posted a number of prosecutorial accomplishments during its first several
years of operation. 7 Current challenges include the need to reauthorize the
Special Court for Corruption after a successful challenge to the constitutionality
of its existence, 8 and charges that, in the face of upcoming elections, the KPK's
focus has become politically motivated.' 9 Still, early signals suggest that in
Indonesia the independent anti-corruption agency can have an important role to
play, particularly in jump-starting corruption reform efforts that could not-or
would not-be implemented by the current corruption-ridden government
agencies.
But enforcement reforms focused outside of the existing investigatory and
prosecutorial agencies is not a healthy long-term solution for a country as vast
and complicated as Indonesia. With 235 million people, it is the fourth largest
country in the world, spread across approximately 6,000 of the 18,000 islands of
its equatorial archipelago. Indonesia's former leader, Suharto, centralized
government operations in the capital of Jakarta, leaving the legacy of pervasive
and entrenched corruption, but more recent constitutional reforms have reversed
this concentration. The salutary effect is greater regional autonomy; the negative
consequence has been increased government corruption at the local level as
opportunities for rent-seeking become more widely available. A single anti-
corruption agency, even if well staffed and sufficiently funded (which the KPK
currently is not) cannot hope to reach beyond a relatively few instances of high
profile corruption which are likely centered in the capital.20
17. SOREN DAVIDSEN, VISHNU JUWONO & DAVID G. TIMBERMAN, CURBING CORRUPTION IN
INDONESIA, 2004-2006: A SURVEY OF NATIONAL POLICIES AND APPROACHES : 53 (2006) (crediting the KPK
with "initiating a growing number of investigations and prosecutions ... (which resulted in the convictions of
former Aceh Governor Puteh and members of the KPK)"; Tim Lankester, Reform of Indonesia's Governance:
Myth or reality?, The Straits Times Interactive, Apr. 9, 2007, http://www.ytlcommunity.con/commnews/
shownews.asp?newsid=28804 ("The [KPK] has held hundreds of investigations and prosecuted former
ministers, business leaders, governors and legislators."). There has been steady growth in the number of
corruption cases brought by the KPK. In 2004, the year the Court came into existence, a single case was filed.
Sixteen new cases were filed in 2005, and 25 new cases were filed in 2006. Anti-Corruption Court, Annual
Report 2006 14. See also KPK, Annual Report 2006 4.5-4.12, http://www.kpk.go.id/modules/wmpdownloads/
files/AnnualReport_2006_4.pdf.
18. Fabio Scarpello, Reversing Indonesia's Anti-Corruption Drive, Asia Times Online, May 6, 2007,
http://www.atimes.comlatimesSoutheastAsiaIICO6AeO1 .html.
19. Bill Guerin, Politics of Corruption in Indonesia, Asia Times Online, Mar. 29, 2007, http://www.
atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/IC29AeO1.html (noting "[g]rowing opposition complaints of discriminatory
justice" being aimed at the KPK); and Ary Hermawan, Has Politics blunted anticorruption campaign?, Jakarta
Post.com, Nov. 13, 2007, http://www.thejakartapost.com/review/nat04.asp.
20. At the end of 2006, the KPK had fewer than 100 investigators and prosecutors. KPK, supra note 14,
at 3.6, http://www.kpk.go.id/modules/wmpdownloads/files/AnnualReport_2006-3.pdf (figures for employees
in the "Repression Unit").
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For a number of reasons, Indonesia's KPK and independent corruption
agencies in other countries with similar geographic reach and diversity-of-crime
challenges, must be seen as a limited and likely short-term supplement to the
permanent governmental investigatory and prosecutorial services, which must
receive the more fundamental and sustained corruption reform attention. One
concern is that, while anti-corruption agencies may work well in small nations
like Hong Kong and Singapore, the very things that make them effective-they
are small, elite, and nimble-mean that they cannot effectively reach into every
province to attack public corruption at the roots. In Indonesia, the KPK has taken
on several large, high profile cases, predominantly involving government
agencies in Jakarta. In those cases, it has done well, but its reach is necessarily
limited. Indeed, the KPK charter is specifically restricted to cases involving
significant state losses, law enforcement or other high government officials, or
cases which have otherwise achieved widespread notoriety.2' To reach corruption
by judges, local agency and customs officials, as well as the petty but entrenched
corruption in various administrative bureaucracies, law enforcement needs local
investigators and prosecutors who are familiar with local conditions and have
real access to local witnesses and evidence.22 Such cases cannot be effectively
investigated and prosecuted from the capital; only the prosecution service, which
has a presence in every province and district in the country, is equipped to tackle
23such cases.
An additional issue arises from the necessarily limited scope of an anti-
corruption agency's jurisdiction. While corruption may be the focus of
investigatory efforts, it is very often a symptom or cause of other criminal
activity, such as tax evasion, customs violations, bank fraud, prostitution, money
laundering, and particularly in Indonesia, illegal logging. Even if not apparent at
the outset of an investigation, these links between criminal activity often lead
investigators in corruption cases to evidence of other crimes, and vice versa.
Leads in corruption investigations, new witnesses and testimony can arise out of
the investigation of these and other substantive crimes. On a strategic level,
stamping out corruption requires that law enforcement also take steps to eradicate
the criminal activity that spawns corruption. Tactically, such crimes should be
prosecuted together, so that cases involving, for example, illegal smuggling and
corrupt payments to customs officials are more effectively prosecuted when
criminal charges relating to the full panoply of conduct can be brought against
defendants in a single case, or at least by a single prosecution team. Only the
21. Law 30/2002, Art. 11.
22. DAVIDSEN, supra note 17, at 35 ( quoting complaint of Ervyn Kaffah, National Coalition of NGOs
Against Corruption that the current President Yudhoyono's "shock therapy on corruption ... is only happening
in Jakarta.").
23. In contrast to the relative handful of prosecutors at the KPK, Indonesia's prosecution service has at
least 5600 prosecutors stationed in dozens of offices around the country. PRICE WATERHOUSE COOPERS &
BRITISH INSTITUTE OF INT'L AND COMP. LAW, Focus ON PEOPLE, THE FINAL REPORT OF THE GOVERNANCE
AUDIT OF THE PUBLIC PROSECUTION SERVICE OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA '49 (2001).
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national prosecution service has the authority (in Indonesia) to prosecute such
other crimes, and only it has prosecutorial experience in those areas.
Finally, and most fundamentally, focusing on building the anti-corruption
agency may have the paradoxical effect of weakening law enforcement generally,
as good prosecutors and resources are diverted to the anti-corruption agency. In
Indonesia, the combined mandates that the KPK's investigators and prosecutors
be lent from the Attorney General's Office and police, and that they be of high
competence and integrity, leads to an "institutional 'zero-sum game'... ,
wherein the KPK draw[s] staff resources away from th[e other] two
organizations. 24 Such skimming may leave the police and prosecution service
demoralized, less effective, and potentially more corrupt than before,
undermining the broader state-building and public confidence-lifting strategies.
These many concerns indicate that creation of, and support for, anti-
corruption agencies in large developing countries that present the same types of
institutional challenges as Indonesia should not come at the expense of reform of
the core police and prosecution services.25 These institutions, unlike anti-
corruption agencies with limited mandates, are structured to address the wide
range of law enforcement efforts that good governance requires. Competent
professionals with the will to combat corruption currently exist within them, and
more importantly, an appropriate commitment of resources combined with efforts
to shift the tide of embedded expectations and practices, may indice more
dedicated, skilled individuals to join.26
In developing countries like Indonesia, the formation of anti-corruption
agencies should not be viewed as the long-term solution to problems with anti-
corruption enforcement. Establishing and maintaining the rule of law over the
long term is dependent upon a functioning and respected justice system. The
traditional police and prosecution service should be equipped with appropriate
powers to investigate and prosecute public corruption offenses, and reform of the
prosecution service itself to make it more professional, productive, transparent,
and effective, is a necessary ingredient of sustainable corruption reform.
24. DAVIDSEN, supra note 17, at 52. The KPK has attracted considerable support from foreign donors,
which is not undeserved. KPK, supra note 14, at 3.7-3.10. By contrast, donor support for the much larger
Indonesian National Police and Attorney General's Office, although increasing, remains marginal.
25. See ADB/OECD Anti-Corruption Initiative for Asia-Pacific, Anti-Corruption Policies in Asia and
the Pacific: Progress in Legal and Institutional Frameworks in 25 Countries 45 (2006) http://www.oecd.org/
dataoecd/32/31/36832820.pdf (noting that many countries in the Asia-Pacific region have set up ACCs, but in
many of these same countries "general law-enforcement agencies have not yet benefited from particular
attention and reform.").
26. Leonard Ginocchi, Accountabilit, Matters in Anti-Graft Drive, Jakarta Post.com, July 26, 2007,
http://www.thejakartapost.com/yesterdaydetail.asp?fileid=20070726.F05; Davidsen, supra note 17, at I
("President Yudhoyono is committed to punishing corruption, and there is a small but significant constellation
of reform-minded actors inside and outside the government who have the potential to make a difference.").
